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A fully homomorphic encryption system hides data from unauthorized parties, while still allowing
them to perform computations on the encrypted data. Aside from the straightforward benefit of
allowing users to delegate computations to a more powerful server without revealing their inputs, a
fully homomorphic cryptosystem can be used as a building block in the construction of a number
of cryptographic functionalities. Designing such a scheme remained an open problem until 2009,
decades after the idea was first conceived, and the past few years have seen the generalization of this
functionality to the world of quantum machines. Quantum schemes prior to the one implemented
here were able to replicate some features in particular use-cases often associated with homomor-
phic encryption but lacked other crucial properties, for example, relying on continual interaction
to perform a computation or leaking information about the encrypted data. We present the first
experimental realisation of a quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme. We further present a
toy two-party secure computation task enabled by our scheme. Finally, as part of our implemen-
tation, we also demonstrate a post-selective two-qubit linear optical controlled-phase gate with a
much higher post-selection success probability (1/2) when compared to alternate implementations,
e.g. with post-selective controlled-Z or controlled-X gates (1/9).
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzos first imag-
ined constructing a cryptosystem with the property that
a party without a valid secret key required for decryption
can nevertheless correctly evaluate a function f directly
on a ciphertext x, without learning anything about ei-
ther f(x) or x [1]. In addition to the obvious benefit
of being able to delegate computation to a party that
is otherwise not trusted with private data, cryptogra-
phers have observed that elegant cryptographic solutions
to particularly interesting tasks can be constructed on
top of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme–secure
multiparty computation, non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs, one-time programs, to name a few [2–6]. De-
spite the apparent utility of such an encryption scheme,
the question of whether it was possible to efficiently con-
struct one remained open until 2009 when the first fully
homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme was constructed
for classical machines [7].
In quantum computing, a range of works have ad-
dressed the closely related problem of secure delegated
computing [8–15] wherein Alice (whose quantum com-
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puter may be of limited power) can implement a quantum
computation with the help of Bob (who possesses a more
powerful quantum computer), without revealing her com-
putation (or equivalently, her input). In these secure del-
egated quantum computing schemes, interaction between
Alice and Bob can occur repeatedly as they collaborate
to perform the desired computation. By contrast, in a
fully homomorphic setting Bob is allowed to apply any
quantum computation of his choice without further assis-
tance from Alice. A secure delegated computing scheme
therefore is not amenable to the wider gamut of crypto-
graphic uses that a true FHE scheme should be, even if
they are similar in spirit insofar as both allow delegation
of computation on private data.
The question of quantum fully homomorphic encryp-
tion was studied more recently. The first proposals
treated the problem in an information-theoretic security
setting, where QFHE was subsequently shown to be im-
possible unless severe compromises to universality or se-
curity were made [16]. Schemes that were proposed under
this model [17, 18], and subsequently demonstrated ex-
perimentally [19], leaked parts of the input and therefore
do not satisfy mainstream notions of cryptographic secu-
rity. Under standard cryptographic security, analogous
to classical FHE where security necessarily requires com-
putational assumptions, two QFHE schemes were theo-
retically proposed for tasks with a limited number of T
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2gates [20]. This work left open the question of QFHE
for arbitrary quantum circuits, but could be seen as the
first QFHE scheme for circuits with a small number of T
gates. A theoretical extension later removed this limita-
tion to enable QFHE on circuits with an arbitrary num-
ber of T gates [21].
In this work, we implement and experimentally demon-
strate for the first time a QFHE scheme proposed in [20].
In addition to the core scheme, we also experimentally
demonstrate a small two-party task enabled by QFHE
that cannot otherwise be performed. In this task Alice
and Bob are to compare and compute the inner prod-
uct between their qubit states, without being able to
learn any additional information (e.g. tomographically
complete statistics) about the other party’s state. Vari-
ous two- and three-qubit circuits in these demonstrations
are implemented optically in a four-photon setup, with
each qubit encoded in photon polarisation and one pho-
ton serving as herald. Our experiment includes a novel
realisation of a phase-add gate, a two-photon operation
with post-selection success probability of 1/4; far higher
than 1/9 for an equivalent implementation with a more
typical post-selective two-qubit gate in photon polarisa-
tion.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In sec-
tion II we lay out various attributes required in a QFHE
scheme followed by a detailed description of the proto-
col that we implemented. Section III describes our ex-
perimental apparatus and then proceeds to discuss data
showing the core QFHE scheme at work. Finally, section
IV details the two-party computation task and discusses
experimental data pertaining to it.
II. THEORY BACKGROUND
A. What makes an encryption scheme
homomorphic?
A public key encryption scheme describes a procedure
Epk for encrypting a plaintext φ using a public key, pk,
to get a ciphertext Epk(φ); as well as a procedure Dsk
for decrypting a ciphertext ψ = Epk(φ) to recover the
plaintext φ = Dsk(ψ) using the secret key sk.
A homomorphic encryption scheme derives its name
from the fact that, operationally, it behaves like a homo-
morphism between plaintext and ciphertext (call these
φ and ψ respectively). Loosely speaking, each valid
operation (e.g. modular addition/multiplication) on φ
maps to a well-defined operation on the corresponding
ψ, called an ‘evaluation map’. If we write an operation
between plaintext as , and the corresponding operation
(or evaluation map) between ciphertext as ◦, we want:
Epk(φ1 φ2) ≡ Epk(φ1)◦Epk(φ2) = ψ1 ◦ψ2 for any φ1 and
φ2.
While the description above serves as a useful tem-
plate, no fully homomorphic cryptosystem in practice
actually works by leveraging homomorphisms in Epk and
Dsk in the strict sense. Instead, the evaluation map for
an operation  takes, as input, ciphertext ψ1 and ψ2 and
outputs a ciphertext that would decrypt to φ1  φ2 –
not necessarily the same ciphertext you would get from
encrypting φ1  φ2 directly. On a quantum machine, |φ〉
and |ψ〉 are states in a Hilbert space acted upon by quan-
tum channels, for example, a unitary gate, or sequence
of gates, U . By analogy, for quantum homomorphic en-
cryption, the evaluation map for U is a quantum channel
U ′ with the property: DskU ′Epk |φ〉 = U |φ〉.
To be considered fully homomorphic, we require an
encryption scheme to satisfy certain properties:
• There must be an efficiently computable evaluation
map for any valid operation on the plaintext. In a
gate-based quantum computing model this means
every gate in a universal gateset (e.g. Clifford +
T). A scheme that is only partially homomorphic
(RSA cryptosystem [22], famously homomorphic
only in multiplication modulo N) doesn’t lend itself
to many use-cases often associated with FHE.
• A party (say Bob) in possession of ψ ought be able
to perform the evaluation map for an arbitrary se-
quence of gates U of his choice without further as-
sistance from other parties (say Alice). In practice,
we augment this by allowing Alice to supply a com-
bination of specially prepared qubits and classical
data collectively called the ‘evaluation key’. Cru-
cially, these should be generated at the same time
as Alice prepares ψ, and must not themselves de-
pend on U .
• The scheme should be compact, meaning that the
difficulty of decrypting the output of the evaluation
map for U should not depend on the difficulty of
computing U . At the very least, decryption should
not be as difficult as computing U , otherwise homo-
morphic evaluation becomes trivial: simply append
a description of U to a ciphertext, and leave Alice
to apply it as part of the decryption procedure.
B. An almost-homomorphic scheme
To construct a QFHE scheme, we begin with the secure
delegated computation scheme in [15], which we briefly
describe here. Alice generates random classical bits a, b ∈
{0, 1} and encrypts her qubit by applying corresponding
Pauli operators: |ψ〉 = ZaXb |φ〉. If a and b are drawn
from a uniform distribution and used as one-time-pads,
|ψ〉 looks like the maximally mixed state to everyone but
Alice. Bob then proceeds to compute on this ciphertext
with some unitary U ′ to produce U ′ |ψ〉.
If U ′ consists only of a sequence of Clifford gates then
Alice can decrypt and obtain the correct (computed)
plaintext again by applying the correct Pauli operators:
Za
′
Xb
′
U ′ |ψ〉 = U ′ |φ〉. As long as Bob’s gate sequence
3Single Qubit Clifford Gates
U = ZaXb U Za
′
Xb
′
U Matrix Representation a′ b′
X
(
0 1
1 0
)
a b
Y
(
0 −i
i 0
)
Z
(
1 0
0 −1
)
H 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
b a
P
(
1 0
0 i
)
a⊕ b b
Two Qubit Clifford: CNOT
• = ZaXb • Za⊕cXb
ZcXd ZcXb⊕d
TABLE I. Key transformation under Clifford gates. In cir-
cuit diagrams above, ZaXb and Za
′
Xb
′
are encrypting and
decrypting maps performed by Alice.
U ′ is known to Alice, she can deduce the correct decryp-
tion keys (a′ and b′) from her encryption keys (a and b)
(see Table I).
A non-Clifford element, like the T gate (T = |0〉 〈0| +
eipi/4 |1〉 〈1|), must be added to the Clifford set for quan-
tum computation to be universal. However, as soon as
Bob performs a T gate, decryption requires more than
just Pauli operators. As shown in Fig. 1 a phase gate
that isn’t otherwise part of U ′ may need to be applied,
depending on encryption key b and all Clifford operators
that precede the T gate.
Performing the phase correction without requiring Al-
ice to divulge encryption key b to Bob can be done with
an ancilla qubit containing the correct phase. Each time
Bob performs a T gate, he communicates to Alice all op-
erations performed prior to that T gate. Alice prepares
an ancilla with an appropriate phase. Bob uses this an-
cilla in the simple teleportation circuit in Fig. 2, which
allows that phase (modulo pi) to be ‘kicked back’ onto |ψ〉
thereby performing the desired post-T -gate phase correc-
tion.
T = Za
′
Xb
′
T P b
′
Za
′+b′Xb
′
FIG. 1. A non-Clifford gate, like T , potentially requires ad-
ditional pi/2 phase correction here written as a P gate.
ZaXb |φ〉 U ′Clifford T • Za′′Xb′′T |φ〉
ZrP s |+〉 k
FIG. 2. Phase correction after a T gate that does not require
Alice to divulge encryption key b to Bob. Decryption keys a′′
and b′′ now depend on a, b, r, s, k and U ′Clifford.
Shortcomings in this almost-homomorphic protocol are
clear. Primarily, it is an interactive one: every time
Bob performs a T gate, he must communicate with Al-
ice. Both quantum (ancilla qubit) and classical (Bob’s
description of U ′) data must be exchanged during each
interaction. More critically, preparation of ancilla and
decryption of ciphertext can only be done if Alice knows
Bob’s computation, U ′. Neither of these attributes is
desired in a QFHE scheme.
C. A QFHE scheme
The scheme implemented in this paper, which was first
proposed and theoretically analysed in [20], makes the
following crucial modifications to the protocol just de-
scribed above to make it homomorphic:
• First, we ‘front-load’ preparation of all ancilla
qubits. During encryption Alice prepares two an-
cilla qubits: |ξa〉 = ZqP a |+〉 and |ξb〉 = ZrP b |+〉
where q, r ∈ {0, 1} is another set of random bits.
Observe from Table I that single-qubit Clifford
gates can transform each decryption key into just
three possible values: they become either a, b, or
a + b. If the Clifford sequence preceding a T gate
implies b′ = a or b′ = b, Bob uses |ξa〉 or |ξb〉 respec-
tively in a teleportation circuit (Fig. 2) to apply the
require phase correction. But if b′ = a+b, Bob first
applies that teleportation between the ancillas to
obtain: ZsP a+b |+〉, which has the correct phase.
This resulting qubit is then used as before to cor-
rect the phase on |ψ〉 (see Table II). If additional
T gates are anticipated in the gate sequence, Alice
simply prepares more ancillas correspondingly.
• Second, we leverage a classical FHE scheme to
make our quantum protocol truly homomorphic.
As she prepares ciphertext |ψ〉, Alice also homo-
morphically encrypts her encryption keys: a →
Enc (a) and b → Enc (b), and sends them to Bob.
During evaluation, as he computes U ′ |ψ〉, Bob
also transforms these encrypted classical keys cor-
respondingly: Enc (a, b) → Enc (a′, b′). We stress
that Bob can do this only because the (classical)
encryption on a and b is fully homomorphic.
These modifications together address shortcomings
in the almost-homomorphic scheme that we’ve de-
scribed. The first modification makes the protocol non-
interactive. All resources that Bob needs to evaluate his
circuit correctly, including ancilla qubits, are prepared
and sent at the beginning of the protocol. Combining
the protocol with classical FHE negates the need for Alice
to be cognizant of Bob’s circuit – the homomorphically
encrypted secret key, suitably modified by Bob during
computation, allows her (and only her) to correctly de-
crypt |ψ〉. In section IV we discuss a use-case in which
these features are important.
No protocol is without caveats however. Briefly, the
reader should be aware that the QFHE protocol we
4Case 1: b′ = b, use |ξb〉 = ZjP b |+〉
Example:
ZaXb |φ〉 T • Za′′Xb′′ T |φ〉
ZjP b |+〉 k
a′′ = j + b (k + 1) + a
b′′ = b
Case 2: b′ = a, use |ξa〉 = ZiP a |+〉
Example:
ZaXb |φ〉 H T • Za′′Xb′′ TH |φ〉
ZiP a |+〉 k
a′′ = i+ a (k + 1) + b
b′′ = a
Case 3: b′ = a⊕ b, use both |ξa〉 and |ξb〉
Example:
ZaXb |φ〉 P H T • Za′′Xb′′ THP |φ〉
ZiP a |+〉 • k2
ZjP b |+〉 k1
a′′ = i+ j + a (b+ 1) + (a+ b) k2 + bk1
b′′ = a+ b
TABLE II. Table of ancilla qubit(s) usage. We denote by a′
and b′ secret keys a and b, transformed by unitary preceding
T -gate. Here, i, j ∈ {0, 1} are classical keys that secure |ξa〉
and |ξb〉 respectively. All arithmetic taken modulo 2.
demonstrate here: a) assumes the existence of a classical
FHE that is secure against a quantum adversary and b)
requires an evaluation key (i.e. ancilla qubits) whose size
grows doubly exponentially with the T -depth (i.e. num-
ber of layers of T gates sequentially applied). A clever
way to modify evaluation of T gates in order to solve (b)
was proposed in [21]. However, if Bob’s circuit is known
to have a fixed T -depth, as in our implementation, then
this is not an issue. With regards to (a), known classi-
cal FHE schemes are believed to be resistant to quantum
attacks [23].
III. EXPERIMENTAL REALISATION
We implemented the core QFHE protocol described
above in section II C in an optical setup. Our imple-
mentation accommodates a total of three (1 data + 2
ancilla) logical qubits and is capable of performing arbi-
trary single-qubit rotations, but is limited to a single two-
qubit gate per pair of qubits and to circuits of T -depth
one (i.e. no cascaded T gates). These latter restrictions
are simply due to the limited scale of the specific setup
we constructed in our laboratory, and do not imply any
fundamental limitation of the protocol in general.
FIG. 3. Schematic of optical circuit designed to implement
each canonical case enumerated in Table II. Each incoming
rail from the left is a separate photon from an SPDC event
(see Figure 4 for source schematic). Liquid-crystal retarders
allow us to modulate the phase of a qubit much more quickly
and precisely than a motorised waveplate mount. Two-qubit
gates shown here in dashed boxes can be bypassed as nec-
essary, either by swapping a photon onto another rail or by
translating “CNOT 1” out of the optical path.
A key distinguishing feature of our protocol is its han-
dling of encryption/decryption by Alice as well as T gates
performed by Bob. The reader will recall that Clifford
gates preceding a T gate modify the secret key in just
one of three ways, each of which necessitates a different
usage of the ancilla qubits. We sought to demonstrate
our protocol is both correct and secure when handling
each of these three canonical cases involving a T gate.
To this end, we realised the three corresponding circuits
shown in Table II in our optical implementation.
Qubits in our implementation are encoded in the po-
larisation degree-of-freedom of photons. Single-qubit
gates are realised using standard birefringent polarisa-
tion optics. Two-qubit gates, specifically controlled-X
and controlled-Z gates, are implemented post-selectively
by leveraging bosonic bunching or the Hong-Ou-Mandel
(HOM) effect [24–27]. Fig. 3 shows a schematic of our
optical apparatus.
Photons in our experiment are produced in a type-1
spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) source.
The source is a 2mm thick BBO crystal pumped with
404nm blue light produced via second harmonic gener-
ation (SHG). The SHG setup is in turn pumped with
a Ti:Sapphire laser (Coherent Chameleon Ultra) con-
figured to pulse with a repetition rate of 80MHz, cen-
ter wavelength of 808nm and transform-limited pulse
duration of 150fs. Fig. 4 shows a schematic of our
source. During use, photons from this source are spec-
trally narrowband-filtered (3nm FWHM, Edmund Op-
tics). When power for the blue (404nm) pump is set to
5FIG. 4. Source schematic
average at 10mW, the source produces photons at a rate
of approximately 5000 pairs/second with a heralding ef-
ficiency of about 16% (before losses accrued in optical
gates), and 4-fold coincidences of 0.5 quads/second. Our
detectors are a combination of Perkin-Elmer (now Exceli-
tas) SPCM-AQRH-W2 and SPCM-AQ4C modules cou-
pled to home-built coincidence logic configured to operate
with a coincidence window of 4ns.
The classical FHE that we have selected for en-
crypting all classical keys is the “Brakerski-Gentry-
Vaikuntanathan” scheme [28] as implemented in the ‘HE-
lib’ library [29], lightly modified for easy integration with
the experiment. The library was called with a plaintext
base p = 2, security parameter k = 80 and number of
plaintext slots l = 150.
A. A novel optical gate architecture for adding
phases
General two-qubit gates in our experiment are imple-
mented via second order interference of indistinguishable
photons at a beamsplitter. If the beamsplitter is carefully
designed to fully transmit and not reflect horizontal po-
larised photons (TH = 1, RH = 0), while partially reflect-
ing vertical polarised photons (TV = 1/3, RV = 2/3), one
can easily show that the effective operation upon post-
selection in the coincident basis is a controlled-Z gate in
polarisation [26]. In Fig. 3 we refer to such an optical
element as a partially polarising beamsplitter (PPBS).
We note that the post-selection success probability here
is 1/9.
Observe, however, that it is not always necessary to
implement a general controlled-X. The controlled-X
between ancillas in case 3 of Table II, for example,
merely serves as a means of accomplishing phase addi-
tion (modulo pi) between |ξb〉 and |ξa〉. That is, we want
a channel such that:
(|0〉+ eiφa |1〉)
a
⊗(|0〉+ eiφb |1〉)
b
→(|0〉+ ei(φa+φb) |1〉)
a
.
However, since both ancillas are confined to states on
the equator of the Bloch sphere, it turns out we can be
more efficient by replacing the PPBS with a fully polar-
ising beamsplitter (PBS, i.e., TV = 0, RV = 1). Con-
sider the mode transformation of the PBS followed by
a Hadamard gate (i.e., halfwave plate at 22.5 deg) on
one output arm, acting on ancilla states |0〉+ eiα |1〉 and
|0〉 + eiβ |1〉 (in our convention, a photon in H or V po-
larisation encodes |0〉 or |1〉 respectively):
1
2
(
aˆ†H + e
iαaˆ†V
)(
bˆ†H + e
iβ bˆ†V
)
→ 1
2
√
2
aˆ†H
(
bˆ†H + bˆ
†
V
)
− e
i(α+β)
2
√
2
aˆ†V
(
bˆ†H − bˆ†V
)
where aˆ† and bˆ† are bosonic creation operators in the two
input/output modes of the PBS. Subscripts on these op-
erators label polarisation. The Hadamard gate following
the PBS acts on mode b. In the last line, we’ve omitted
terms that do not contribute to coincidence events be-
tween modes a and b. Now post-selecting on finding a
photon in either H or V (i.e. |0〉 or |1〉) in mode b, we
find the photon in mode a is left in state |ζ〉:
Post-selecting on bˆ†V : |ζ〉 =
1√
2
(
|0〉+ ei(α+β) |1〉
)
Post-selecting on bˆ†H : |ζ〉 =
1√
2
(
|0〉 − ei(α+β) |1〉
)
Note that |ζ〉, when post-selection on bˆ†V succeeds, is
exactly the qubit state that we expect on the middle rail
in case 3 of Table II, when classical bit k1 = 0. If post-
selection on bˆ†H succeeds on the other hand, |ζ〉 does not
quite correspond to k1 = 1. Nevertheless, |ζ〉 carries the
correct phase modulo pi so all that is required is that we
update the key transformation rule indicated in Table II.
That rule should now read:
a′′ = i+ j + a (b+ 1) + (a+ b) k2 + k1
where we now define k1 = 0 when post-selection on bˆ
†
V
succeeds and k1 = 1 when bˆ
†
H succeeds.
We also note that the success probability for post-
selection of each polarisation on the b mode photon is
1/4, so that the total post-selection success probability
is 1/2. This is far more efficient than 1/9, which we ex-
pect from a general controlled-X.
B. Data and results
With the optical apparatus shown in Fig. 3 we im-
plemented the circuits in Table II. These were designed
to highlight our protocol’s novel aspects under three
canonical secret key transformations (discussed in sec-
tion II C) due to Cliffords preceding a T gate; T |ψ〉,
TH |ψ〉, THP |ψ〉 being the simplest of these.
6Alice prepares and encrypts her data qubit in the pho-
ton on the top-left rail. She also prepares two appropri-
ate ancillas encoded in photons on the two bottom-most
rails. When implementing cases 1 and 2 (i.e. when Bob
evaluates T |ψ〉 or TH |ψ〉), the phase-add gate is not re-
quired so we swap the appropriate ancilla up into the
second rail, where it is then allowed to interact with the
ciphertext qubit at “CNOT 1”.
When implementing case 3 (i.e. when Bob evaluates
THP |ψ〉), phases on both ancillas are first summed at
the phase-add gate. Meanwhile, the ciphertext qubit is
allowed to bypass “CNOT 1” (relevant optical compo-
nents are moved out of that photon’s path). The cipher-
text qubit that began as the top-left photon now propa-
gates directly to “CNOT 2”, where it is entangled with
the remaining ancilla (the other now serves as a herald
for successful operation of the phase-add gate).
All (classical) bits resulting from measurement that
Bob performs while evaluating T |ψ〉, TH |ψ〉, or
THP |ψ〉 are sent back to Alice in order that she be
able to perform decryption correctly. To verify that the
protocol works as advertised, Alice prepares a variety of
plaintext states and measures in a variety of bases after
decryption so as to be able to infer the process map for
Bob’s evaluation. If indeed the protocol is correct, Al-
ice’s tomographic reconstruction of Bob’s process should
closely match the ideal T , TH, or THP unitary.
We further repeat the experiment, this time with Al-
ice’s secret keys purged and replaced with a set of erro-
neous keys before she has a chance to decrypt ciphertexts
returned by Bob. In this case, we expect the tomograph-
ically reconstructed process to be the completely depo-
larising channel instead. Decryption with erroneous keys
is accomplished by asking HElib to generate two sets
of keys, sk1 and sk2, and programming Alice to com-
pute Decsk2 (Encsk1 (a, b, i, j)), thereby simulating what
an attacker with no access to the correct key sk1 might
observe.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 show plots of how a unit (Bloch)
sphere transforms under each canonical gate sequence
enumerated in Table II. The top-left panel in each fig-
ure shows a unit Bloch sphere representing the set of
all possible input plaintext state, each represented by a
unique color. Top-right panels in turn show what each
state maps to (ideally) under the T , TH, or THP gate
sequence. For comparison, the bottom-left panels show
tomographic reconstructions of Bob’s process when de-
cryption is done correctly—these should resemble the
top-right panels. Finally, bottom-right panels show to-
mographic reconstructions of Bob’s process when decryp-
tion is not done properly – these should resemble the
fully depolarising channel.
We compare our experimentally reconstructed chan-
nels with an ideal desired channel by calculating the
average process fidelity [30]. When decryption is done
correctly, these process fidelities are 96.1%, 96.2%, and
83% with respect to the ideal T , TH, and THP uni-
tary respectively. When decryption is not done correctly,
the corresponding process fidelites are 51.7%, 47.4%, and
50.2% (the fully depolarising channel has process fidelity
of 50% with respect to any unitary). We also compare
these latter channels directly with the ideal fully depolar-
ising channel, yielding process fidelities of 99.8%, 99.7%,
and 99.4% respectively, suggesting that any attempt to
decrypt the ciphertext with an erroneous key will only
result in noise.
In the case of correct decryption, the primary limit-
ing factor for these experimental process fidelities is the
quality of our two-qubit gates. In turn, the dominant
source of error in these gates is imperfect two-photon in-
terference visibility. Photons from the same SPDC event
(i.e., “intra-pair”) exhibited HOM interference contrast
of 97.0± 0.5% at a 50/50 BS (∼ 77% at a PPBS, where
80% is expected) whereas photons from different SPDC
events (i.e., “inter-pair”) had a contrast of 90.0 ± 1.5%
(∼ 72% at a PPBS). Experimental fidelity for the THP
unitary is significantly worse than the other two because
of the need to cascade two two-qubit gates, thereby com-
pounding errors. Specifically, the phase-add gate is fol-
lowed by “CNOT 2” as described above and shown in
Fig. 3, the latter operating by HOM interference between
photons from different SPDC events.
FIG. 5. Tomographic reconstruction of T unitary. From
top-left to bottom-right: Initial Bloch sphere of pure states;
simulation of that Bloch sphere under ideal T ; experimen-
tal reconstruction with correct decryption; and experimental
reconstruction with bad decryption.
7FIG. 6. Tomographic reconstruction of TH unitary. From
top-left to bottom-right: Initial Bloch sphere of pure states;
simulation of that Bloch sphere under ideal TH; experimen-
tal reconstruction with correct decryption; and experimental
reconstruction with bad decryption.
FIG. 7. Tomographic reconstruction of THP unitary. From
top-left to bottom-right: Initial Bloch sphere of pure states;
simulation of that Bloch sphere under ideal THP ; experimen-
tal reconstruction with correct decryption; and experimental
reconstruction with bad decryption.
FIG. 8. Background compensated version of Figure 7.
Recall that our experimental two-qubit gates yield the
correct processes when second-order interference between
two single-mode bosonic creation operators occurs at a
beamsplitter followed by post-selection on exactly one
boson in each output mode. Practical limitations in con-
struction of the apparatus (e.g. imperfect alignment of
collection modes, defects in collection optics, and vari-
ances in spectral profile of narrowband filters) contribute
to finite interference contrasts. Furthermore, inter-pair
photons may not have the same (coherent) spectral cor-
relations that exist in intra-pair ones, thereby partially
invalidating the single-mode assumption.
A less obvious but equally important effect is the con-
tribution of parasitic processes that lead to unwanted co-
incidence events. For instance, higher-order SPDC events
that yield more than one photon per output mode can
contribute to successful post-selection (i.e., coincidence)
events that do not yield the desired output states. Sim-
ilarly, because our coincidence windows while small are
nevertheless finite, two uncorrelated photons or detector
noise can nevertheless register erroneously but positively
on our coincidence circuit.
Practical limitations imposed by equipment or pro-
cedural imperfections cannot be remedied easily. And
while background processes due to higher-order SPDC
events can be mitigated by reducing pump power, do-
ing so results in impractically small signals. However,
since our apparatus is sufficiently well characterised, we
can calculate the expected prevalence of background pro-
cesses described above and subtract them from our signal
in post-processing. Background-subtracted experimental
data for the THP unitary is shown in Fig. 8. With back-
ground subtraction, process fidelity for the tomographic
reconstruction of the THP unitary with correct decryp-
8tion increases from 83% to 94%.
In the interest of thoroughness, we have also presented
the same data in bar-chart form in Figs. 9 through 11.
Those figures show the magnitude of elements of the pro-
cess matrix. In the Kraus representation of a qubit map
ρout =
∑
j KjρinK
†
j , the matrix Mjk = χjk + iξjk suc-
cinctly defines Kraus operators Ki in terms of a standard
Pauli basis: Kj =
∑
k (χjk + iξjk)σk. Here χ, ξ ∈ R and
σk is to be interpreted as a Pauli matrix with the follow-
ing labelling: σ0 = I, σ1 = X, σ2 = Y , and σ3 = Z. Re-
constructions were performed using standard maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE) [31].
FIG. 9. Tomographic reconstruction of T unitary. From top-
left to bottom-right: (a) & (b) real and imaginary parts of
process matrix, given correct decryption; (c) & (d) real and
imaginary parts of process matrix, given wrong decryption.
FIG. 10. Tomographic reconstruction of TH unitary. From
top-left to bottom-right: (a) & (b) real and imaginary parts
of process matrix, given correct decryption; (c) & (d) real and
imaginary parts of process matrix, given wrong decryption.
FIG. 11. Tomographic reconstruction of THP unitary. From
top-left to bottom-right: (a) & (b) real and imaginary parts
of process matrix, given correct decryption; (c) & (d) real and
imaginary parts of process matrix, given wrong decryption.
IV. AN APPLICATION OF QFHE: TWO-PARTY
SECURE COMPUTATION
A. Protocol Description
In this section, we describe a protocol we developed in
order to demonstrate a use-case for QFHE that is other-
wise difficult to accomplish. Imagine Alice and Bob each
possesses a qubit state, ρα and ρβ respectively. They are
tasked with finding the inner product or fidelity between
their states
Dαβ = Tr
(√
ρ
1/2
β ραρ
1/2
β
)
= |〈α|β〉| . (1)
However, they wish to do this without sharing any more
information about their qubit state than strictly nec-
essary. Here we describe a protocol that accomplishes
this in the so-called ‘honest-but-curious’ setting – i.e., we
merely seek to secure data from curious prying eyes, but
we assume that Alice and Bob are honest at carrying out
their tasks and therefore make no attempt at verifying
computation to guard against erroneous results.
A simple solution to learning Dαβ for pure states is
the comparator circuit shown in Fig. 12. It is easy to
show (see Appendix) that under this circuit, the projec-
tor Π1,1 = |1〉 〈1| ⊗ |1〉 〈1| has an expectation value that
directly yields infidelity 〈Π1,1〉 = 12
(
1−D2αβ
)
. If ρα or
ρβ is mixed, we must replace D2αβ in the last equation
with D(2)αβ = Tr
(
ρ
1/2
β ραρ
1/2
β
)
. Note, for consistency, that
this reduces back to |〈α|β〉|2 = D2αβ for pure states. We
build our protocol on this simple comparator circuit with
these slight additions.
As prescribed by our QFHE scheme, Alice encrypts all
n copies of her qubit by preparing σ
(1)
α ⊗ ... ⊗ σ(n)α =
9ρα • H
ρβ
FIG. 12. Simple comparator circuit
FIG. 13. Secure comparator. Here, σ
(i)
α is the i-th encrypted
copy of Alice’s qubit, ρβ is Bob’s qubit, and k
(i)
1 , k
(i)
2 ∈ {0, 1}
are classical measurement outcomes.
Z~aX
~bρ⊗nα X
~bZ~a and sends them all at once to Bob
along with classically homomorphically encrypted keys
Enc (~a) and Enc
(
~b
)
. Here, ~a,~b ∈ {0, 1}⊗n and X~a
is to be interpreted as Xa1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xan . Bob in turn
performs the comparator circuit between each of Al-
ice’s qubit σ
(i)
α and his own ρβ . Figure 13 illustrates
this. After measuring the i-th pair of qubits, Bob ho-
momorphically adds classical outcomes k
(i)
1 and k
(i)
2 to
Alice’s encrypted keys to obtain Enc
(
ai + k
(i)
1
)
and
Enc
(
bi + k
(i)
2
)
. Referring to key transformation rules in
Table I, note that once Alice decrypts these and computes
1
n
∑
i
{(
ai + k
(i)
1
)
×
(
bi + k
(i)
2
)}
, she correctly obtains
〈Π1,1〉. Addition & multiplication in the summands are
modulo 2, whereas the top-level summation is on the full
set of integers.
An essential step in our protocol is for Bob to scram-
ble the order of Enc
(
ai + k
(i)
1
)
and Enc
(
bi + k
(i)
2
)
be-
fore returning to Alice the scrambled classical ciphertexts
Enc
(
as(i) + k
(s(i))
1
)
and Enc
(
bs(i) + k
(s(i))
2
)
where s (i)
is a random permutation on the set {1, ..., n}. This is
important in order to ensure the security of Bob’s qubit
which, unlike Alice’s qubit, is not encrypted. Absent this
scrambling, Alice can prepare and keep track of the inner
product between Bob’s qubit and a variety of states of her
choosing, thereby effectively doing tomography on Bob’s
state. This completes the description of our protocol.
B. Experimental Demonstration
We implement this protocol by using a subset of our
full setup, with minimal modifications. Figure 14 illus-
trates this. Computer-controlled waveplates representing
Alice and Bob were programmed to randomly select and
prepare qubits from a predefined set of logical/plaintext
states (determined by range and precision of motion of
our motorised actuators). In Alice’s case, these waveplate
FIG. 14. Experimental setup for our secure comparator two-
party protocol.
settings take into account randomly generated one-time-
pads. The infidelity between Alice’s and Bob’s states is
then measured as described above and plotted against its
actual value in Fig. 15. As we have done in previous sec-
tions, we also ran the protocol for the same set of logical
input states but with an intentionally erroneous decryp-
tion key. The result is shown in Fig. 16. Every point in
each of these plots contains ∼ 960 photons or qubits.
Observe in Fig. 15 that in the case of correct decryp-
tion 2 〈Π1,1〉 shows good agreement with theoretically
expected values (dashed line), indicating the protocol in-
deed allows Alice retrieve the infidelity between her state
and Bob’s. By comparison, in Fig. 16 where decryption
is done incorrectly, 2 〈Π1,1〉 hovers near a constant 0.5
(i.e., the infidelity w.r.t. the maximally mixed state),
suggesting that anyone without the secret key gains no
information about that infidelity.
FIG. 15. Plot of measured vs actual infidelity between two
states, given correct decryption. Dashed line indicate ex-
pected theoretical values.
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FIG. 16. Plot of measured vs actual infidelity between two
states, given wrong decryption. Dashed line indicate expected
theoretical values – decrypting with an erroneous key should
yield 0.5 (i.e. infidelity relative to the maximally mixed state).
Good agreement with this dashed line indicates that result of
the computation is well hidden from parties without a valid
decryption key.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this work we constructed, implemented, and demon-
strated a fully homomorphic encryption scheme for uni-
versal gate-based quantum computers first proposed
in [20] and extended in [21]. With this scheme, any party
in possession of encrypted qubits may evaluate a quan-
tum circuit of their choice. This is accomplished with
the aid of ancillas and classical bits prepared at the time
of encryption and transmitted along with the ciphertext.
Multiple use of a communication channel, quantum or
classical, is not required. Explicit knowledge of the cir-
cuit(s) evaluated is not necessary for correct decryption.
Furthermore, we make no concessions on security apart
from assumptions that underlie the classical homomor-
phic cryptosystem that we use to construct our scheme.
Previously demonstrated schemes compromise on one or
more of these attributes.
We also solve the simple task of computing the inner-
product of two qubit states securely; that is, without
allowing either party to tomographically characterise the
other’s qubit. Our encryption scheme provides for an
elegant solution to this task, which is otherwise difficult
to accomplish.
While our scheme is secure in theory, we note that
our optical implementation relies on post-selections that
do not always succeed. This, along with practical ex-
perimental losses, implies that a significant number of
photons that carry the same qubit state will fail to reg-
ister on our detectors. Keys that in theory ought to be
one-time-pads may no longer actually be used exactly
once in practice, and a would-be attacker could siphon off
these otherwise ‘lost’ photons to gain information about
plaintexts. Nevertheless, we stress that these are techni-
cal shortcomings that can be remedied in a production
setting, for example by greatly increasing key-switching
rate (impractical in our setup) or simply using a different
physical platform and/or gate design entirely.
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VI. APPENDIX: INFIDELITY MEASURE
FROM A SIMPLE COMPARATOR CIRCUIT
Suppose ρα = |α〉 〈α| and ρβ = |β〉 〈β|. Now write |α〉
and |β〉 in the computational basis:
|α〉 = c0 |0〉+ c1 |1〉
|β〉 = d0 |0〉+ d1 |1〉
where ci, di ∈ C and
∑
i |ci|2 =
∑
i |di|2 = 1. We can
therefore rewrite:
D2αβ = |〈α|β〉|2
= |c∗0d0 + c∗1d1|2
= |c0d0|2 + |c1d1|2 + 2Re (c0c∗1d∗0d1)
= 1− |c0d1|2 − |c1d0|2 + 2Re (c0c∗1d∗0d1)
Now consider the circuit in Figure 12. The two-qubit
state that results is:
|α, β〉 → 1√
2
{
(c0d0 + c1d1) |0, 0〉+ (c0d0 − c1d1) |1, 0〉
+ (c0d1 + c1d0) |0, 1〉+ (c0d1 − c1d0) |1, 1〉
}
which immediately yields:
〈Π1,1〉 = 1
2
|c0d1 − c1d0|2
=
1
2
{
|c0d1|2 + |c1d0|2 − 2Re (c0c∗1d∗0d1)
}
=
1
2
(
1−D2αβ
)
Note that if ρα and/or ρβ is/are mixed states, cross-terms
arise in squaring Dαβ . In that case, this last equation
holds if we replace D2αβ with:
D(2)αβ = Tr
(
ρ
1/2
β ραρ
1/2
β
)
